Sri Lanka is facing an unprecedented crisis, and unless its foreign exchange inflow increases significantly within the next few months, it will not be able to avoid a sovereign default and the economy will go into a tailspin, the signs of which are already visible. The government is also troubled by a serious internal conflict at a time when it should be able to focus on the economic front without being distracted by any other issues.
The government is floating a story, through a section of the media, that it is planning to hold an election, possibly the Local Government (LG) polls, which it has postponed for one year. It seems to be trying to mitigate the political fallout of the polls postponement by having the people believe that it is ready to face an election anytime.
The SLPP has organized a series of mass rallies purportedly to educate the public on its development activities. The first rally was held in Anuradhapura on Wednesday (09). There is hardly any need for the government to conduct such a campaign to advertise its development activities, which are already given wide publicity.
The reason why the SLPP has suddenly decided to hold rallies is not difficult to understand; it is seeking to shore up its crumbling image and counter the Opposition’s anti-government campaign, which is gaining momentum. The JVP’s countrywide protest campaign to rally popular support has upset the government so much so that the JVP leaders have come under egg attacks by pro-SLPP goons.
The launch of the SLPP’s political rallies has fueled speculation that the government is getting ready for an election.
Hypothetical situation
What would happen if the LG elections were held soon by any chance with the current politico-economic conditions remaining unchanged?
The ruling SLPP, whose popularity has reached its nadir, would suffer a huge electoral setback. Its performance at the recently-concluded cooperative society elections has been under par. The SLFP might be able to improve its electoral performance to some extent, but, overall, its association with the SLPP would work against it. The SJB is not focused on anything as such; it is running around like a headless chicken, flogging issues haphazardly. Other than displaying their oratorical skills by bellowing rhetoric, the SJB leaders are not doing anything serious to build their party’s image and recover lost ground. Therefore, the SJB would not be able to tap public resentment in such a way as to be able to secure control of a significant number of local government bodies. The TNA has reduced itself to a regional political party, over the years, and perhaps it may be able to maintain popular support at the present level as there is no other formidable political party to rival it in the North and the East. Only the JVP would be able to improve its electoral performance considerably.
It is highly unlikely that the people will elect a JVP-led government, for the JVP lacks the ability to govern the country, and its policies are far from pragmatic. The people, who are fed up with the main political parties, may cast enough votes for the JVP to obtain some more seats in the parliament as in 2004, when 39 of its candidates who contested parliamentary polls on the SLFP-led UPFA ticket were returned. They, however, may not mind enabling the JVP to control a considerable number of local government authorities, perhaps as an experiment, the way the people of Tissamaharama did in 2002. The JVP won the Tissamaharama Pradeshiya Sabha in that year, but lost it a few years later. An increase in popular support for the JVP at the LG level would affect the SLPP, the SLFP and the SJB at the provincial and national levels as well because it would be able to better its performance at the Provincial Council and parliamentary elections at their expense.
The ruling family cannot be unaware that something similar to the aforementioned hypothetical situation is likely to play out in case of the LG polls being held anytime soon. The Rajapaksaslearnt a bitter lesson in 2015, when they recklessly advanced a presidential election in a bid to wrongfoot the Opposition; instead, that ill-advised move caused President Mahinda Rajapaksa to trip and suffer a nasty fall. They lost power because President Rajapaksa was overconfident and took his younger brother Basil’s advice seriously. The rest is history.
Mountains and molehills
Politicians are given to making propaganda mountains out of molehills of their rivals’ problems, and doing it the other way around as regards their own internal issues. On Tuesday (08), Chief Government Whip and Minister of Highways Johnston Fernando went ballistic in the parliament when Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa said that the government was planning to tax the Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF) and the Employees’ Trust Fund (ETF), inter alia, and demanded answers from the government to some questions he raised on the current economic situation. Instead of providing answers or undertaking to bring the questions to the notice of Finance Minister Basil Rajapaksa, who was not present in the House at the time, Minister Fernando took on Premadasa. He dwelt on the SJB’s internal problems although they had no relevance to the issue at hand.
Minister Fernando claimed that Premadasa was becoming increasingly assertive and aggressive because the latter felt threatened by SJB MP and former Minister Champika Ranawaka, who, he said, was eyeing the post of the Opposition Leader.
Political differences between Ranawaka and Premadasa may not be as bad as Fernando has made them out to be, but there is no love lost between the duo; Ranawaka has presidential ambitions and is working towards achieving that goal with the help of his 43 Brigade, which is a movement grooming him for the presidency. Premadasa did not attend the national convention of 43 Brigade held recently at Kotte.
Some SJB seniors are not well-disposed towards Premadasa and his inner circle as they feel that they have been marginalized. They are also of the view that Premadasa’s wife, Jalani, interferes with party affairs too much. SJB MP Sarath Fonseka is openly critical of the party’s strategy. He has gone on record as saying the SJB is not doing enough to convince the public that it is a viable alternative to the SLPP. He has called for a course correction.
Minister Fernando sought to kill two birds with one stone on Tuesday—diverting the attention of the House and the media from the Surcharge Tax Bill, which aims to tax the EPF and the ETF, among others—and driving in the wedge as regards the rivalries between Premadasa and Ranawaka. Whether he succeeded in his endeavor is in doubt.
The beam in SLPP’s eye
The SLPP is faced with a crippling internal battle between its leadership and the majority of coalition partners although it is busy blowing others’ intraparty disputes out of proportion. The leaders of the SLFP, the National Freedom Front, the Democratic Left front, the Pivithuru Hela Urumaya, the Communist Party, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party and Youthukama, are not well-disposed towards the SLPP leadership, especially Finance Minister Basil Rajapaksa, who rides roughshod over them. They are even critical of some of the key policies of the government. The SLFP has already declared its intention to contest future elections separately if push comes to shove, and the SLPP is trying to form a government under its own steam.
Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa has tried to reconcile the warring factions in the SLPP coalition camp, but without much success. The Basil faction of the SLPP calls the shots in the government and makes all political decisions. It is all out to humble the rebel group led by Ministers Wimal Weerawansa, Vasudeva Nanayakkara and Udaya Gammanpila and former President Maithripala Sirisena.
It is obvious that the Wimal and Basil have not buried the hatchet. In an interview with last week’s Irida Lankadeepa,Wimal defended President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who, he insisted, had not failed. But he did not say anything in defenceof Basil when he was asked whether the government’s economic performance had improved since Basil took over as the Finance Minister.
The SLPP seems to think it could win back public sympathy with the help of an aggressive political campaign instead of attending to crippling economic issues and doing something serious to reconcile its constituents to prevent a possible breakaway. Self-deception will entail a huge political cost.
