Yuan Wang 5, the controversial dual-purpose vessel belonging to China, has already sailed out of Sri Lanka’s shores after a strategic mission to the Hambantota port in southern Sri Lanka. It was strategic for multiple reasons, China was testing the water to create a precedent and to give a hint that Indian objections do not matter at all to them.
The vehement objection to the arrival of the Chinese research and survey vessel came from the highest level of the Indian administrative apparatus but to no avail. Maybe domestic considerations owing to the turbulent political situation that prevailed in the country would have taken precedence over anything else and prevented the governmental hierarchy from perusing the implications and the dangers involved.
Instead, the vital policy matter was not given due consideration and pushed aside.
The decision was to be made by lower-level officers in the Defence Ministry. The governmental hierarchy was preposterously preoccupied with domestic political issues that proved disastrous on the home front and international sphere. The Ranil Wickremesinghe administration that took over the reins soon after the departure of Gotabaya Rajapaksa made a determined effort to mitigate the diplomatic slip-up.
Nevertheless, it became an extremely formidable task for them to reverse the decision after granting permission for the Yuan Wang 5 to dock at the Hambantota Port.
India’s sensitivity to the arrival of the vessel was echoed through the Indian media following the initial communication form the government of India.. So was the United States. Two other powerful countries operating behind the scenes dispatched diplomatic epistles to Colombo but averted its access to the public domain, Japan and the United Kingdom, also expressed their reservations about the arrival of the Yuan Wang 5.
Sri Lanka, it appears, still has to work out a formula which will settle sensitive security issues with neighbouring India, for which India too will have to bear responsibility since their concerns were indirect and lacked clarity and precision. At the same time, Sri Lanka ought to understand the innuendos of the Indian security establishment with due assiduity.
As far as India is concerned, Sri Lanka should examine with diligence the events that unfolded in the contemporary political history of Sri Lanka in the late eighties.
Did J.R Jayewardene, known to be a political genius, misread India? Jayewardene, a politician with unique characteristics at one stage as a young political activist, was influenced and inspired by the Indian freedom struggle launched by Mahatma Gandhi and worked with many Indian political icons to work out elaborate plans for Sri Lanka.
He, in particular, worked with Govind Ballabh Pant, an Indian freedom fighter and the first chief minister of Uttar Pradesh. Alongside Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabh Bhai Patel, Pant was a prominent figure in the movement for India’s Independence and later a pivotal figure in the Indian government.
When Pant was in Colombo in the eighties in his capacity as India’s Defence Minister, President Jayewardene reminded him how he worked with his father in the Indian freedom struggle. Although Jayewardene’s intellectual prowess was above most other politicians in the region, he missed the vital point of the importance of India for Sri Lanka to forge ahead as a vibrant economy in the Indian Ocean region.
One time Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka who later became Foreign Secretary J.N Dixit, explains in his book ‘Assignment Colombo’ how the initial diplomatic gaffe between Delhi and Colombo came about.
Indira Gandhi had an antagonistic view towards Sri Lanka based purely on her perceptions of Jayawardene and his international connections, and the close affinity he maintained with Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai and then President Sanjiva Reddy.
It came to light that both Prime Minister Desai and President Reddy had made caustic comments about Mrs. Gandhi’s ability to rule India. All this gossip somehow found its way to Mrs. Gandhi’s. Dixit justifies India’s position in the early eighties and says it was natural for Mrs. Gandhi to view Jayewardene in an unsympathetic light. According to Dixit, the other matter of concern for Jayewardene which led to animosity between Mrs. Gandhi and Jayewardene, was her friendship with Sirimavo Bandaranaike.
However, under these circumstances, the more apposite question is whether there could be personal matters and considerations that could come into play when dealing with more complex issues relating to statecraft. If Gandhi-Jayewardene’s dislikes led to a diplomatic faux -pas, then it could have been sorted out without delay for the greater good of the two countries.
As far as India was concerned, the diplomatic blunder allegedly committed by Jayewardene, was his close affinity with the west and in particular with the United States. He received assistance from Pakistan and Israel to suppress Tamil militancy to the chagrin of New Delhi. For Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Tamilnadu was a compelling factor. Jayewardene’s attitude aggravated the situation and the New Delhi government first issued a statement about the deteriorating situation in northern Sri Lanka. Delhi not only sympathised with the Tamil cause but also appointed a special envoy to Sri Lanka, Goplaswamy Parthasarathy, a seasoned diplomat who had worked with India’s first Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.
During the early part of the eighties, a senior figure in the US strategic and intelligence establishment, General Vernon Walters, visited Colombo twice. It brooked unabated diplomatic ripples in Delhi. On the other hand, the Jayewardene administration in Colombo helped to set up the Voice of America station in Iranawila, close to a coastal location in Chilaw in the north -western province. India claimed it had authentic evidence that the VOA station had other capabilities of electronic intelligence operations. The Jayewardene government structured its foreign policy to such a degree that India had enough reason to believe that it could be detrimental to their political might in the region.
Vernon Walters revealed how India was providing arms training to Tamil youth to create havoc in the country.
Soon after the 23rd July 1983 debacle in Thinnaveli, where the LTTE killed thirteen Sri Lankan soldiers, the backlash reached unprecedented levels. India, taking advantage of the situation, dispatched then Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao to Colombo to assess the situation.
Foreign Minister Rao had a lengthy discussion with President J.R Jayewardene. JRJ and India resolved to look at the ethnic issue more pragmatically and to devise an acceptable solution. Goplaswamy Parthasarathy played the Indian mediator role.
The assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had reverberating effects on Indo-Lanka relations, and the Tamil Parties in the orth were particularly alarmed by the emerging situation. For a moment, they lost a fallback position.
In October 1984, President Jayewardene attended the funeral of Mrs Gandhi and met with the new Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who promised to start the negotiations afresh.
President Jayewardene perceived that it would create a better atmosphere for Indo-Lanka relations.
In June of the same year, Jayewardene was in Delhi for talks and visited Bangladesh along with Rajiv Gandhi in Gandhi’s air force jet for a visit to President Ershad. It was after much persuasion by Gandhi that Jayewardene agreed to accompany him to Dhaka to give assurances to President Ershad on the impending first SAARC summit.
Rajiv Gandhi appointed foreign secretary Romesh Bhandari as the principal mediator. The Jayewardene government, after much pondering, agreed to talk to the LTTE and other militant groups which had sprouted by then. The Jayewardene government had all the time maintained the position that it would not be prudent to talk to the militant groups officially since they would assume legitimacy as an equal partner. However, Bhandari pointed out that it was possible in Punjab, where the state apparatus talked to the militants to resolve a crisis.
The Thimpu talks initiated by India failed mainly because of the attitude of Romesh Bhandari and that of Sri Lanka.
The offensive against the LTTE continued unabated despite Indian efforts to reach a political solution through negotiations. The thrust against the LTTE was severe. It virtually pushed them to a corner and in a desperate position, they tried to get through to India through the Editor of the Hindu newspaper to indicate that they were ready for talks subject to certain conditions.
At this point, Rajiv Gandhi wanted the Sri Lankan government to halt all operations.
President J.R Jayewardene defied the Indian missive to stop operations. The President asked the Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, J.N Dixit, what Gandhi would do if ‘we continued’. ‘I can’t even predict what he would do”, was Dixit’s reply. Indian authorities then dispatched a flotilla of boats with food supplies to the north. The Sri Lanka Navy took prompt action and turned away the fishing boats carrying the goods. Subsequently, Indian air force cargo planes, the AN 32s, were used to drop supplies on the Jaffna peninsula to show India’s solidarity with the Tamil people there. The supply aircraft which were escorted by Mirage fighter jets violated the air space of another sovereign nation. The Sri Lankan air control was warned that if intercepted, there would be retaliatory action. India had violated Sri Lanka’s air space and caused a diplomatic standoff but simultaneously paid the price for the folly in the long run.
Knowing very well the nature of megaphone diplomacy that India is indulging in, Minister Gamini Dissanayake had on numerous occasions cautioned President J.R Jayewardene.
Minister Dissanayake submitted a memorandum stating that Sri Lanka should be awake to the geo-political realities of the region.
He has also said that the unity and stability of Sri Lanka depended on having a stable equation with India.
He had suggested that it could be well structured in line with Finland’s relations with Soviet Russia.
Yuan Wang 5 has left our shores without much drama. Yet, Sri Lanka has to learn lessons concerning the geo-political interests in the region. The most important of all is to sustain equilibrium as far as security in the Indian Ocean region is concerned.
