Demise of a political legend and future of Sri Lanka’s left movement – II

Rise of an ultra-radical left movement 

By Vishvanath

Political conformism of the traditional left, the resultant dilution of its revolution ideology and the adoption of economic policies they once rejected as capitalist and exploitative, e. g. economic liberalization, inter alia, created conditions for the emergence of a radical left claiming to espouse ‘real socialism’. The process of the decline of the old left received a boost from the subjugation by the Communist Party of Sri Lanka (CPSL) and the Lanka Samasamaja Party (LSSP) of their socialist policies to those of the SLFP-led United Front coalition (UF), a case in point being the crushing of the bank employees’ strike in 1972. They were accused of being driven by political expediency rather than the socialist cause they flaunted. The LSSP asserted itself in the UF coalition government to some extent but was unceremoniously ousted from the UF Cabinet.  Political damage that the LSSP suffered was irreversible. The same holds true for the CPSL, which left that UF coalition ahead of the 1977 general election.

Another factor that led to the decline of the old left in Sri Lanka was the post-World War II economic situation, especially in the 1960s. The global economy was on a firm footing with the capitalist bloc having consolidated its dominance across the world, but Sri Lanka’s economy was facing setbacks. On the domestic political front, the CPSL suffered a split in 1964 between reformists and revolutionaries and an SLFP-led coalition consisting of the traditional leftists was defeated by the UNP in 1965.

Rohana Wijeweera exploited that situation, advocating a truly socialist movement and revolution as the only way to capture state power. Some other factors that facilitated the birth of the JVP on May 14 1965, for all intents and purposes, were the UNP ascent to power in 1965, economic difficulties the people were facing, the slashing of the rice subsidy, growing unemployment among the youth, especially in the rural sector, and the lukewarm reaction of the Opposition consisting of the traditional left to the unpopular UNP policies at the time in sharp contrast to the way they responded a reduction in rice subsidy in 1953, when the LSSP led a hartal, which almost toppled a UNP government.

In 1964, Wijeweera, son of a staunch CPSL member from Matara, after being refused a visa to return to Russia to resume his medical studies, because of his political views and activities that were not the liking of Moscow, joined the CPSL (Peking) wing led by legendary socialist Nagalingam Shanmugathasan. Soon, he became disillusioned with the CPSL breakaway group as well. Claiming that the Peking Wing was also revisionist, he together with six members of it met in Akmeemana, and founded a party that would later be known as the JVP. Wijeweera initially claimed his party was the real Communist Party of Sri Lanka before naming it the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) or the People’s Liberation Front. It is of interest that the birth of the JVP was also due to the disintegration of the old left, and it was not a revolutionary alternative that emerged from outside.

The challenge before the JVP was to be different from the traditional left, which Wijeweera condemned as a collective of revisionist and conformist political organizations lacking courage and political vitality to challenge the rising capitalist forces in the country. He used the defeat of the SLFP-led coalition with leftists as constituents in the 1965 general election to bolster this argument. However, the JVP had its work cut out to make inroads into the support bases of the LSSP, the CPSL and the centre-left Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (ME), especially the trade union sector, dominated by the LSSP. It would achieve that goal later.

The following are some of the striking differences between the JVP and the traditional leftists of the day:

·         The JVP called itself a truly revolutionary party. Other leftist parties were reformist, revisionist and had adopted parliamentarianism.

·         The JVP believed in an armed struggle to capture state power. Other leftist parties had given up the idea of using violence for that purpose.

·         The JVP’s support base consisted mostly of Sinhala-educated, petit bourgeois youth in rural areas facing economic hardships while the other leftists were supported by urban English-educated, upper middle-class youth considered privileged under the existing social order.

·         There was no discernible difference between the JVP’s leadership and rank and file during its initial stages. Other socialist parties were characterised by a hierarchical leadership structure.

·         The JVP was secretive about its activities. The traditional left resorted to underground activities only during World War II and were open about their activities.

·         The JVP remained Marxist to the core and remained committed to a rigid doctrinaire approach to everything it did. Its leftist rivals were accused of being right-leaning while claiming to be diehard socialists.

·         The JVP’s supporters were mainly from the majority community. (This would change after the formation of the National People’s Power (NPP) as evident from the 2024 general election results. The traditional left had support among all communities.

·         The JVP did not believe in party conventions and was not open about recruitment initially whereas the traditional leftist parties held conventions and kept their recruitment transparent and flexible.

Overall, the JVP did not evolve as a party of the proletariat and its support was initially confined to the disadvantaged youth although it had a proletariat mindset.

A look at the JVP’s past shows that despite the party’s avowed commitment to doctrinaire policies, it did not hesitate to soften its stance in situations where such compromise was necessary for it to increase its political strength and expand its support base. Hence its decision to back the SLFP-led United Front (UF) coalition in the 1970 general election. Its activists led the UF’s propaganda campaign from the front, with its stalwarts, such as Mahinda Wijesekera, carrying out the coalition’s poster campaign. They played a pivotal role in propelling the UF to power. They however made it clear that they were not supporting the LSSP and the CPSL in the UF coalition.

In April 1971, the JVP took up arms against the very government it had helped form, making various claims, including the one that the new leaders were not socialist enough and had reneged on their promise to look after the interests of the ordinary masses. That insurrection marked a direct confrontation between the JVP and the traditional leftists, who were in power as UF constituents. The UF government, led by Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike crushed the JVP uprising in a brutal manner, and most of the JVP leaders, including Wijeweera, were incarcerated.  (Next: Further decline of old left, the transformation of JVP and brief political marriage with SLFP)