By Kassapa
The main opposition party, the Samagi Jana Balavegaya (SJB) is in panic mode these days. They are frantically seeking ‘partners’ to oust the Jathika Jana Balavegaya (JJB) from controlling as many local councils as possible when these institutions are convened on June 2. Has the SJB weighed the pros and cons of this exercise and is it on the right track, one must ask.
True, the SJB enhanced its share of the vote at the May 6 elections from 17.6 per cent at the general election in November 2024 to 21.6 per cent this month. Despite the low voter turnout, its absolute voter also increased by almost 300,000 votes. Yes, it is a sizeable increase but it is not enough to propel it into government in the near future.
The SJB would do well to compare this improved performance against the other main opposition player in the political arena, the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP). Its share of the vote increased from three per cent to nine per cent, a six per cent rise and its absolute vote rose by 600,000 votes, more than double the increase of the SJB.
The SJB must learn from history. At the 2020 general elections, it emerged as the single largest opposition party, with 24 per cent of the vote and 54 seats in Parliament. The JJB came a distant fourth, with three per cent of the vote and a mere three seats in Parliament.
When there was a public uprising against then President Gotabaya Rajapaksa in mid-2022, the SJB was ideally placed to take over government at the next national elections. SJB leader Sajith Premadasa took the morally and politically correct decision to stay away from the ‘unholy’ alliance between Ranil Wickremesinghe and the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP). From that position, one would have thought that ascending to government was the most likely outcome. Instead, it allowed the JJB to come from behind and steal a march over the SJB. The JJB not only won, it did so in spectacular style winning over a two-thirds majority at the general election.
If the SJB is not careful in choosing its policies and strategies, this could happen again. From being a distant third, the SLPP can overtake it at the next national elections and, even if it does not win government, become the single largest opposition party in Parliament. It is in this context that the local government election results must be analysed and acted upon by the SJB. Unfortunately for the party, it does not appear to be doing so.
Instead, it is in a desperate rush to form alliances with whoever is willing to join in a bid to deny the JJB the spoils of victory. This is mostly so for the ultimate prize at the elections, control of the Colombo Municipal Council (CMC).
To their credit, the SLPP has been hesitant. Namal Rajapaksa did attend a meeting convened by the irrepressible Ranil Wickremesinghe to discuss opposition strategy but came out of it uttering excuses and saying that while his party has no objection to others trying to dethrone the JJB, it will only align with those who have similar principles. In effect, he was saying that the SLPP was not keen to partner the SJB.
By summoning a meeting of opposition parties, Wickremesinghe added to the chaos that was building in the opposition camp. With less than five per cent of the vote and less than 500,000 votes island-wide and not winning a single local council, Wickremesinghe’s United National Party (UNP) cannot dictate discussions on forming alliances. He was only doing what he does best: undermine the SJB and Premadasa in particular.
One can however understand the UNP trying to get a foothold of some sort in whatever local council they can. Their party is dying with no hope of resurrection because Wickremesinghe, at the age of seventy-six and leading the UNP for over thirty years and losing three presidential elections, refuses to relinquish the party leadership. Voters see the same tired old faces uttering the same rhetoric and don’t want to vote for the UNP anymore. Faced with despair, the UNP would be satisfied with gaining any kind of authority in any council.
There is no need for such do-or-die tactics for the SJB. It is still best placed to become the best right-of-centre alternative to the left-leaning JJB. Its leading lights are not tainted as much with corruption as the stalwarts of the UNP and the SLPP are and it has some decent politicians such as Imthiaz Bakeer Markar and Harsha De Silva who can make a difference if they are given the reins of government.
Forming unscrupulous alliances and thereby risking the party’s reputation merely to gain control of a handful of local councils seems like a foolish ploy, even if one excuses them making a play for the CMC which is a traditional UNP bastion. What will follow are allegations of vote buying and corruption. Also, the party will not be able to vouch for the conduct of those who it enlists for support either.
Even if the SJB does succeed in its strategy, all it will gain is the control of a few local councils. While controlling the CMC might be a battle for prestige and a show of political one-upmanship (if a SJB-led alliance manages that!), controlling other local councils will not yield many dividends for the party’s prospects at the next national elections. In fact, it could prove to be a handicap if fragile SJB-led administrations collapse in time to come. Then, the JJB would turn around and say, “we told you, you cannot govern”.
Sajith Premadasa does not have a reputation for making astute political decisions. He does however claim to practise principled politics. In chasing the control of measly local councils for short-term gain, he might be setting himself and the SJB up for long-term pain. The price he is paying, abandoning principled politics, is too high and the reward for it, managing local councils, is paltry. It may turn out to be a colossal political blunder.
