By P.K.Balachandran
Colombo, March 16 – Prof. Robert A.Pape, Director of the University of Chicago Project on Security and Threats, says that given the absence of the desired results from massive aerial bombardment of Iran and the decapitation of its leadership, “the wisest choice for US President Donald Trump will be to accept a limited loss now rather than risk compounding losses later.”
Iran has hurt the US beyond expectations by widening the war theatre to key economic centres in West Asia and crippling the global economy by closing the Gulf of Hormuz, Prof. Pape points out in his latest piece in the US journal Foreign Affairs.
How “Horizontal Escalation” Favors Iran
Operation “Epic fury” began impressively with the killing Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Yet, within hours, any hope that the precise decapitation strikes would limit the scope of the war was dashed, he says.
“Iran’s retaliatory strikes cannot be dismissed as acts of scattered retaliation, the lashing out of a dying regime. Rather, they represent a strategy of horizontal escalation, a bid to transform the stakes of a conflict by widening its scope and extending its duration,” he explains.
Explaining the concept of “horizontal escalation” Prof Pape says that such an escalation occurs when a warring party widens the geographic and political scope of a conflict rather than intensifying it vertically in a single theatre.
“This is an especially appealing strategy for the weaker parties in a military contest. Instead of trying to defeat a stronger adversary head-on, the weaker side multiplies arenas of risk by drawing economic sectors and the public into the remit of the conflict.”
“ Such a strategy allows a weaker combatant to alter the calculus of a more powerful foe. It has worked in the past to the detriment of the United States. In Vietnam and Serbia, US adversaries responded to overwhelming displays of American airpower with horizontal escalation, eventually leading to American defeat,” he recalls.
Crippling US Allies in the Gulf
Iran launched hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones not only at Israel but also across the Gulf. Missiles slammed into interceptors over Doha and Abu Dhabi. At Al Udeid Air Base, in Qatar—the forward headquarters of US Central Command—personnel took shelter as interceptors streaked overhead. Air defences flashed into action at US bases at Al Dhafra in the United Arab Emirates and Ali Al Salem in Kuwait. Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia reported incoming drones. Near the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, naval forces were placed on heightened alert,” he points out.
Political Extension
Iran cannot defeat the United States or Israel in a conventional military contest, but it can make political gains, and through them, secure leverage vis-à-vis the better armed opponent, Prof Pape says.
By launching large-scale retaliation within hours of losing the supreme leader and many senior commanders, Tehran signalled two things: (1) continuity of command and operational capacity, (2) widening the conflict well beyond Iranian territory, effecting what scholars call “multiplication of exposure.”
Rather than confining retaliation to just Israel, Iran struck or aimed at targets in at least nine countries, most of them hosting U.S. forces. These are, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The message to those countries was that hosting American forces would lead to severe consequences.
Decapitation strikes had created powerful incentives for horizontal escalation, Prof. Pape points out.
“Iran’s retaliation has resulted in the closure of airports, the burning of commercial property, the killing of foreign workers, and the disruption of energy and insurance markets. Gulf leaders have been forced to reassure foreign investors and tourists. The war has migrated into boardrooms and parliamentary chambers.”
And in the US itself, the widening scope of the war has alarmed members of Congress.
US officials have floated the idea of stoking an ethnic rebellion in the Kurdish parts of Iran to help target the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. But that might provoke responses from Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, countries that would not welcome a powerful Kurdish insurgency in the region, Prof. Pape warns.
Not the First time
Operation “Epic Fury”” is certainly not the first time that the United States has acted out of the belief that overwhelming airpower can compel rapid political collapse. The U.S. war in Vietnam exposed the limits of this assumption, the expert says.
By 1967, the United States had dropped three times more tonnage worth of bombs on North Vietnam than it had used in World War II. Operation “Rolling Thunder”, launched in 1965, was designed to break Hanoi’s will and destroy its capacity to wage war. Washington possessed tremendous air superiority and apparent escalation dominance, meaning that North Vietnam could not hope to match the United States blow for blow as Washington ramped up the conflict. By the fall of 1967, U.S. airpower had devastated the crucial communication, military, and industrial centres and arteries on which North Vietnamese military power was thought to rest.
Horizontal Extension in Vietnam War
But just a few months later, in January 1968, North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces launched coordinated attacks on more than 100 cities and towns across South Vietnam. They breached the U.S. embassy compound in Saigon. They fought for weeks in Hue. They struck provincial capitals simultaneously. Although the offensive was costly for communist forces, it shattered the perception that a South Vietnamese and American victory was near.
President Lyndon Johnson soon announced that he would not seek re-election. Public confidence in the prosecution of the war eroded. The war’s political trajectory shifted, even as American firepower remained dominant, Prof. Pape recalls.
“The lesson was not that bombing failed tactically. It was that Hanoi escalated horizontally, widening the conflict beyond rural battlefields into South Vietnam’s cities and political nerve centres, transforming a military contest into nationwide political upheaval, and reshaping domestic calculations in Washington.””
Political cost of hosting US Bases
By striking near American bases at Al Udeid, Al Dhafra, and Prince Sultan, Tehran signalled that alignment with Washington entails exposure to attack. The message was that Gulf leaders must balance alliance commitments against domestic and economic stability.
Iran is leveraging economic chokepoints. Roughly a fifth of global oil shipments transit the Strait of Hormuz. Early shipping data suggests traffic through the strait has fallen by about 75 percent since the war began.
Even a partial form of lasting disruption—through missile strikes, naval incidents, or rising insurance costs—produces immediate global ripple effects, fuelling concerns about inflation and domestic political pressure in the United States and Europe.
“None of these objectives require battlefield victories. They just require Iran’s endurance,” Prof. Pape points out.
Creation of Fissures in Gulf and US Politics
If this war drags on, Gulf governments that have quietly expanded security cooperation with Israel may have to make that alignment more visible. That clarity is dangerous since the Arab public remains deeply opposed to Israel’s aggressive military posture in the region.
The longer the conflict continues, the harder it becomes for rulers to sustain that partnership with Israel without sacrificing legitimacy at home.
A protracted war would also reshape American politics. A sudden decapitation strike can galvanize support behind the US President, at least temporarily—although polling suggests that most Americans are already opposed to the war even just one week in. A grinding regional war marked by energy price spikes, US casualties, and uncertain objectives will cause disquiet at home.
Sizable elements of President Donald Trump’s political coalition have been wary of Middle Eastern entanglements and have accused U.S. leaders of simply following Israel’s lead. The longer U.S. military operations continue, the more fractures could widen within Trump’s own base.
Transatlantic Strains
European governments are acutely exposed to energy volatility and migration pressures. If Washington escalates while European capitals want to rein in the conflict, the two sides could diverge as Europeans try to keep themselves at arm’s length from the war.
The US would find the challenges of sustained bombing immense if European states decided to constrain use of their territory for logistics and tanker refuelling flights. The UK is already uncomfortable about the long-standing policy of American military aircraft conducting operations from the British possession of Diego Garcia.
In exchange for European support in its campaign against Iran, Washington may have to commit more to European military objectives in Ukraine—at the risk of further irking the president’s MAGA base.
Boost to Non-State Actors and Terror Groups
US officials have floated the idea of stoking an ethnic rebellion in Kurdish parts of Iran to help target the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. But that might provoke responses from Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, countries that would not welcome a powerful Kurdish insurgency in the region, Prof. Pape warns
Finally, an extended conflict in the Gulf would likely see the involvement of nonstate actors, especially if US. ground forces get involved in even a limited fashion. New and existing militant groups seeking to exploit regional anger may target leaders visibly aligned with US operations. What began as interstate missile exchanges could evolve into a wider tableau of violence and upheaval.
A Waiting Kurd Misadventure
US officials have floated the idea of stoking an ethnic rebellion in the Kurdish parts of Iran to help target the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. But that might provoke responses from Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, countries that would not welcome a powerful Kurdish insurgency in the region, Prof. Pape warns
Trump At Crossroads
If Iran keeps fighting, engaging the US over a wide area, the US will face two paths, one it could ramp up its airpower campaign by bringing additional air assets into the fight. But permanent aerial occupation does not lead to political control, and without greater political control, Iran will continue to pose a plausible threat to U.S. interests.
“The alternative is ending the military commitment. Washington could declare that objectives have been met and stand down its tremendous air and naval forces assembled near Iran. In the short term, the Trump administration would face the intense political criticism that it may have left the job unfinished. This policy, however, would allow the administration to move on to other issues, such as addressing economic needs at home, and limit the political blowback of its decision to attack Iran,” Prof Pape says.
Answer to Trump’s Dilemma
Trump is on the horns of a dilemma, having to judge whether Washington should deal with short but limited political costs now or more protracted and more uncertain political costs later. There is no golden off-ramp, one that increases the political benefits for Washington. Every option now carries political costs and risks.
“Given these realities, the wisest choice may well be for the United States to accept a limited loss now rather than risk compounding losses later,” Prof. Pape says.
END
